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Abstract
The main problem of forest institutional arrangement is the issue of institutional sustainability in achieving 
sustainable forest ecosystem. This study aimed to explain the barriers of institutional sustainability Community 
Conservation Agreement (CCA) designed in Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), in Indonesia, as a collaborative 
management of national parks.  This study is of descriptive which used qualitative approach, i.e. asking open-ended 
questions, reviewing documentation and analyzing textual of community conservation agreements. We found that the 
institutional sustainability barriers of CCA were the local decisions on collective-choice level and that the rules at 
operational level arranged in CCA were not in line with formal rules of national park management at the 
constitutional level. Furthermore, the low capacity of local institutions in heterogeneous villages with many 
migrants in controlling and regulating the forest use, especially in rehabilitation zone areas, also became a barrier to 
institutional sustainability of CCA. of national park Therefore, institutional sustainability of CCA requires support 
management policy that accommodates the sustainability of livelihoods of local communities in national parks, 
strengthening local institution's capacity, and ultimately integrating institution of CCA as part of LLNP 
management.  
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Introduction
National parks protect non-excludable resources that 
provide goods and services such as biodiversity, landscape 
beauty and a variety of ecological services that are difficult to 
be provided through market mechanisms.  The 
state/government should protect and provide non-excludable 
resources, especially those that are indivisible because the 
private sector is not interested in providing them, even 
though  the demand for these resources is very high 
(Nugroho . 2012). The characteristic of these resources et al
present a challenge for the state in achieving sustainability. 
Management of Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), 
located in Central Sulawesi Province, Indonesia,  
characterized by interdependence between the local   
communities and the LLNP management driven by the 
characteristics of the resource including high exclusion costs 
and incompatible in use  (Schmid 2004) . These situations 
need to change the paradigm of national park management, 
accommodating the local communities' interests, using their 
traditional knowledge and local wisdom (Soekmadi 2003; 
Ezebilo 2011; Kosmaryandi  2012; Kitamura & Clapp et al.
2013). Properly, local communities should not be positioned 
as a threat, but as the potential to sustain protected areas 
because they have used forest resources in a long time 
(Abdullahi & AbdulHameed 2012).
Appropriate institutional arrangements of forest 
management enable to use of forests and conservation goals 
can be achieved (Acheson 2006). Bundle of rights owned by  
the parties will determine their position to resources 
(Schlager & Ostrom 1992), and decide incentive to preserve 
and conserve the resources (Agrawal & Ostrom 2001; 
Agrawal 2013). Property rights also play an important et al. 
role in the livelihoods of communities who depend on forests 
and affect forest condition (Lambini & Nguyen 2014).
Community Conservation Agreements (CCA) in LLNP 
which was initiated by international NGOs and local NGOs 
in approximately 40 villages around LLNP in the early 2000s 
was the forerunner of co-management (Birner & Mappatoba 
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2009). CCAs are considered a promoting tool to mediate 
between national park conservation interests and local 
people's needs, integrating traditional informal rules and 
should consider cultural diversity (Mehring  2011). et al.
Ekpe (2012) revealed that the granting of legal rights or 
collaborative management is a form of incentives for 
influencing behavior of people to conserve biodiversity. 
Recognition and incorporation of local institutions are 
necessary as a solution to the problem of non-excludability 
and property rights in achieving sustainable forest 
management (Nursidah . 2012).et al
The critical problem in institutional arrangement is the 
issue of sustainability (  Based on our Adiwibowo  201 )et al. 3 .
pre study in  heterogeneous villages that have many 2
migrants, the institutional arrangement of CCA is not 
implemented sustainably. The research question of this study 
is to explain why the institutional arrangement of CCA 
doesn't work properly as collaboration on LLNP 
management. The purpose of this study was to explain 
profoundly institutional barriers of CCA. We assume  that d
institutional sustainability barriers of CCA not only depend 
on the situation and structure (Schmid 2004), but also depend 
on the role of stakeholders in implementing the rules. 
Capacity stakeholder is a key for the development and 
institutional change. It illustrates the ability of individuals, 
groups or organization to respond the environmental change 
as part of effort in achieving the goal (Dubois 1998). 
Capacity of actors would drive their behavior (Ribot & 
Peluso 2003). This research applied the framework of 
Situation, Structure, Behavior, Performance (SSBP) 
(Schmid 2004), with modification Figure 1( ).
Methods
 This research was conducted from June 2014 to January 
2015 at LLNP, located in Central Sulawesi Province, 
Indonesia. This research conducted a qualitative approach 
(Creswell 2012), namely exploring and understanding the 
institutional sustainability barriers  by asking open-ended 
questions to key informants, reviewing data of 
documentation CCA  and analyzing texts rules of national ,
parks management. This research applied snowballing 
technic to define the key informants. The interview process 
was started from the staffs of illage onservation ouncil v c c
( /LKD), village chiefs, chairmen of l k dembaga onservasi esa
customary institutions and local community in  2
homogeneous villages and  heterogeneous villages that  2
have many migrants around LLNP that implementing CCA, 
and  people from the uffer one orum (4 b z f f worum ilayah 
penyangga/FWP). The kinds of our questions were 
institutional structure, including property rights of local 
communities negotiated in CCA, rules, and their capacity in 
implementing the rules. Furthermore, the interviews were 
conducted with  ocal on- overnment rganizations 2 l n g o
(NGOs) that were facilitating the arrangement of CCA by 
Figure 1 Framework, adapted from Schmid (2004).
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asking the arrangement process of CCA and their capacity in 
facilitating. The interview process was also conducted with 
LLNP officers to find out the structure that hampers CCA and 
with the Regional Development Planning Agency of istrict D
Poso and istrict Sigi to understand their capacity in D
supporting and strengthening the local institutions.
This research used descriptive analysis (Irawan 2006) to 
explain profoundly the institutional sustainability barriers of 
CCA by analyzing the structure of institution CCA and the 
role of stakeholders. We used the theory of property rights 
(Schlager & Ostrom 1992) and theory of rules (Ostrom 1990; 
Ostrom 2005) to describe the structural barriers of 
institutional sustainability of CCA. In addition, we used 
analysis of stakeholders (Dubois 1998) and stakeholders' 
capacity (Ribot & Peluso 2003) to describe the barriers in 
implementing CCA.
Results and Discussion
Property ights of ocal ommunity egotiated on CCA r l c n
Bundle of rights of local communities negotiated on CCA 
consist of access and withdrawal rights, management rights, 
and exclusion rights and did not hold alienation rights, but 
these rights can be bequeathed Table 1 . ( )
 Position of local communities in LLNP management, 
based on bundle of rights designed on CCA, was as 
proprietor. The proprietors not only hold the rights at 
operational level, such as access and withdrawal rights, but 
also hold rights at collective choice level, such as -
management and alienation rights (Schlager & Ostrom 
1992).  Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) stated that the position as 
proprietor who holds collective-choice rights can create 
incentives to conserve resources. Based on document of 
CCA, local communities allowed to regulate the internal use 
of resources.
Rules designed in CCA Rules in managing of Common Pool 
Resource (CPRs) consist of  levels, which are rules at 3
operational level, rules at collective choice level  and rules at - ,
constitutional level (Ostrom 1990). Description of rules 
designed in CCA is shown in Figure 1.
Collective hoice ules  -c r These rules adjust how to regulate 
the aggregation of appropriator and consider their preference 
in management (Anderies  2004). The aim of these rules et al.
is to arrange the operational rules (Ostrom 1990).  
Arrangement of operational rules of CCA involved several 
stakeholders specially LKD, village chief, customary 
institution, LLNP officer and facilitated by NGOs The 
Natural Conservation (TNC) and local .NGOs -  Collective
choice rights of local communities in management of LLNP 
designed in CCA were delegated to LKD. Operational rules 
of CCA that were described in the participatory management 
plan set by LKD and LLNP officer and facilitated by NGOs.  
However, LLNP officer stated that motions of CCA and 
participatory management plan was the concept of NGOs 
who was facilitating and it based on their orientation value.
Operational rules These rules are required to avoid over-
exploitation of resources (Anderies  2004) and specify  et al.
what activity allowed or forbidden (Ostrom 2005).
1 r u Rules of esource tilization in CCA Area 
 Forest resources of LLNP located in CCA area allowed to 
meet the local needs of villagers CCA, but not allowed 
for the outsider.  The forest resources allowed to be used 
consist of non-wood forest products such as rattan, 
bamboo, palm, medicinal plants, dammar and water 
resources, and timber for public facilities and the local 
communities' needs. Villagers also hold rights to manage 
their gardens existing in the LLNP with the provision that 
they were forbidden to expand the garden. Withdrawal 
rules of rattan, bamboo and dammar sap regulated using a 
rotation system which set out in the participatory 
management plan. The harvesting procedures of these 
resources were arranged so that did not damage the trees 
and wildlife habitat, and local communities should 
regenerate the harvested resources. Local communities 
who need forest resources in CCA area should ask 
permission to LKD. Furthermore, the LKD coordinates 
with the village chief and customary institution, and they 
checked the local communities' needs both the number 







Local communities can enter to enjoy the natural beauty in LLNP area           .





W     ithdrawal of timber in the CCA area for the purpose of public facilities and    
  




W        , ithdrawal of non-timber forest products such as dammar sap, rattan, bamboo    
    
pandanus of forest, sugar palm, traditional medicines and water in LLNP area            
    
-
 






Managing continuously the farm existing in LLNP area      
   
-
 
Regulating  the internal utilization of forest resources in CCA area
 
- Rehabilitating the bare land  
Exclusion ightsr - C  ontrolling the forest area and monitoring forest health   
- E    xclude unauthorized parties from utilization of forest resources in CCA area    
- I    mpose sanctions on parties who violate the agreement    
Alienation ightsr The local communities have no but       alienation rights, their rights can be bequeathed  .
Table 1  Bundle of rights of local community negotiated on CCA in LLNP management
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LLNP Officer about the local communities' request. After 
that, LKD gives permission to the local community who 
needs the resources by specifying the number and site of 
allowing harvested resources.
2 r  Monitoring ules
 Monitoring process arranged in CCA was conducted 
together with LKD and LLNP Officers/forest rangers. The 
aim of these rules ware to preserve the resources and to 
avoid damage (Andersson  2014) and to improve et al.
forest condition (Pandey 2010).  To avoid forest 
ecosystem damage in CCA area, the process of 
monitoring was regularly scheduled every  months 6
conducted by LKD and LLNP Officer.
3 e g s Law nforcement and raduated anction 
 Appropriators who violate operational rules would be 
graduated sanction ( ) based on indigenous customary giwu
law through an open court held by customary institutions 
and attended by LLNP officer. Graduated sanction aim to 
hinder participants to conduct a lot of violations of the 
rules (Cox . 2010), because implementation of rules et al
without sanction leads a useless institution (Nugroho 
2013). If the case of infringement in the CCA could not be 
resolved by customary law, then the case of infringement 
would be handed over to the proper authorities and 
customary institution should follow the further legal 
process. 
Institutional sustainability arriers of CCA as b
c m pollaboration anagement ark
1 sProblems of tructure 
Institutional structure affects individual opportunism and 
participatory. Structure refers to institutional alternatives 
to order interdependence (Schmid 2004). In this study, 
structure refers to the rules, property rights and 
government policies in national park management. 
The rules that hamper institutional sustainability of CCA 
consist of choice rules, position rules, aggregation rules 
and payoff rules. Description of the types of rules that 
hamper the sustainability of CCA in LLNP is described in 
Table 2.
 The unclear choice rules were that operational rules 
of CCA were not in line with formal rules, so that rules 
arranged at operational level could not be implemented 
and enforceable because LLNP officer did not recognize 
several rules at operational level. Local decisions which 
were not in line with formal rules at the constitutional 
level consist of rights to withdrawal trees in LLNP area 
Figure 2 Description of rules designed in CCA.
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even if only for local needs and rights to manage 
continuously their farm that existing in LLNP area.  
Development of rules on one level, without supporting 
rules on other levels, would create an unstable system so 
that cannot be long-enduring (Ostrom 1990). Ting  et al.
(2012) revealed this situation on  community based co  
management in Baishuijang National Natural Reserve in 
China, that had a lot of obstacles because most of local 
decisions made by local committee have resulted in 
deadlock  by management authority due to lack of policy 
support.
 Formal legal rules of national park management in 
Indonesia at the constitutional level in conservation 
Law/UU Number 5/1990, Forestry Law/UU Number 
41/1999, Government Regulation/PP Number 28/2011, 
Regulation of Minister of Forestry/P.56/Menhut-II/2006, 
and Regulation of Minister of Forestry/P.19/Menhut-
II/2004, tend to be command and control and local 
communities positioned as the user who only hold access 
and withdrawal rights. The rule at the constitutional level 
is a system of rules that determine the form and condition 
of governance (Carlsson & Berkes 2005). If CCA 
intended as collaboration of national parks, the 
governance system that should be conducted is a merging 
of government control with local community and 
decentralization of decision making (Carlsson & Berkes 
2005). However, management rights as collective choice -
rights held by the local communities to arrange internal 
use of forest resource are not described explicitly in legal 
formal rules. Local communities have weak incentive 
and responsibility for the preservation of resources if they 
only hold access and withdrawal rights, without hold 
collective choice rights (Agrawal & Ostrom 2001; -
Coleman 2011). Strong autonomy of rule-making at local 
level is the key predictor of better forest to support the 
livelihood of local people (Singh  2011).et al.
 National park management with zoning systems has 
also become barriers to sustainability of CCA because 
that rules do not support the sustainability of livelihood of 
local communities in national parks, especially in 
rehabilitation zone and utilization zone. In rehabilitation 
zone areas, local communities preferred to manage 
continuously the land as farm and in utilization zone 
areas, local communities preferred to use it forest as a 
place to take wood for local needs   Meanwhile, formal .
legal rules of designation of those zones do not 
accommodate preference and need of local communities.  
Designation of utilization zone, based on legal formal 
rules, intends for creating natural ecotourism and 
recreation, environmental services, education, research 
that support development of utilization and cultivation 
activities, and designation of rehabilitation zone intend 
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There are rules in the CCA document describing     
 
the types and amount of resources allowed to be        
used, but not in line with legal formal rules    







There is a map of CCA area     
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There are arrangements of forest resource     
  








There are rules that describe the role of the     
  
parties in CCA, but the replacement mechanism   
  
of personnel or leadership in each institution 
involved in CCA doesn’t ensure the    
 








Several members of FWP and LKD were       







There is no aggregation rules regulating the        
   
stakeholder involvement mechanism in the 
management of LLNP 
  
-  Legal formal rules of national park management 
are command and control and local community   
positioned as a user.     
-
 
Rules at collective arrangement level have   




The participatory management plan that 
have been arranged didn’t implemented     
Information rules  
 
-  LKD and LLNP officer/Ranger undertake 
monitoring LLNP area.
 
Forest damage could be prevented as long as 







There is no rule that regulates clearly the  
 proportional benefit that would be received by  
 stakeholders in CCA
FWP and LKD didn’t get salary/income based 
on their performance  
  
Table   Identification of CCA rules2
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Turn of the chairman of customary 
institutions and village chiefs, especially in 
villages where people were heterogeneous, 
lead that the several arranged rules were not 
implemented 
Clarity of user  
LLNP officer did not recognize several rules of       
CCA at the operational level   
Clarity of resources  -
-
-
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 The unclear position rules were that the mechanism of 
staff changes or replacement of leadership in each 
institution engaged in the agreement did not guarantee the 
sustainability of the negotiated agreement, although their 
tasks and roles described in CCA document.  
Consequently, some members of FWP, as institution to 
facilitate resolving conflict between LLNP Officer and 
villagers or among villagers of the sub district, have no 
longer served. Moreover, replacements of chairman of 
customary institution causes rules of CCA have no longer 
understood by some new chairman of customary 
institution especially in heterogeneous villages that have 
many migrants. On the other side, replacement of village 
chief in some villages with CCA caused the rules of CCA 
also have no longer understood by the new village chief. 
Many members of LKD in heterogeneous village have 
already not activated and replaced by village chief.
 Aggregation rules that hamper the institutional 
sustainability of CCA were not described explicitly the 
mechanism of aggregation of stakeholders in LLNP 
management. Formal legal rules of national park 
management are command and control and local 
communities positioned as the user who does not hold 
collective-choice rights. meeting to discuss about  So that, 
CCA was not longer conducted, and local decisions and 
participatory management plan have not been 
implemented by local institutions since this project 
ended.
 CCA was designed as a collaborative management 
(Birner & Mappatoba 2009), so that it needs to implement 
symmetric aggregation rules in order that all stakeholders 
involved in the decision was treated fairly. Collaboration 
rules of protected area in Indonesia set in Regulation of 
Minister of Forestry/ P.19/Menhut-II/2004 do not 
describe technically about the mechanism of involvement 
of stakeholders in collaborating. According to 
Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000), collaboration is a process 
to achieve objectives in Regulation of Minister . However, 
of Forestry , collaboration is not a / P.19/Menhut-II/2004
process, but as a program of activities that needs to 
arrange the time in collaboration as contained in rticle A, 
5 , aragraph 2 c  and rticle 9 , aragraph 1  and 2 .P , A Pth nd th st nd
Design of pay off rules of CCA did not regulate the 
appropriate benefit received by stakeholder in the 
agreement. As a result, LKD as village-level institution 
that maintain and implement the agreement did not 
receive salaries or operating budget. Principle of 
proportional equivalence between benefit and cost is 
required in the robustness of institution (Ostrom 2005; 
Krupa  2014)et al. .   
2 r s p cThe ole of takeholders and roblems of apacity 
 et Every actor has a different spectrum capacity (Enserink 
al. both in gaining, controlling  and maintaining , 2010) 
access (Ribot & Peluso 2003). Indigenous people have 
claimed that LLNP area zoned as CCA was customary 
land that was proven by the existence of the old cemetery, 
and bamboo and coffee plants growing in the area before 
the area was designated as a national park. The land, 
especially in the rehabilitation zone area, was used by the 
local communities for farming while in utilization zone 
area was used by the local communities as site to take 
timber for local needs such as construction materials, 
firewood.
  The migrants who have settled around LLNP such as 
ethnic of Buginese and Javanese had high-capacity to 
gain land in LLNP area.  They conducted access 
mechanism by way of bought the land from indigenous 
people or work on land claimed by indigenous people 
with the profit-sharing.  High-capacity of access to 
technology, capital  and  knowledge of migrants able to 
gain land resources in LLNP, even though they were not 
supported by legal rights (Ribot & Peluso 2003).
  LLNP officer had high-capacity of authorities to 
control access the use of forest resources. However, based 
on the cause of the area of management and the number of 
staffs, LLNP officer have not had optimal capacity to 
control the wide area LLNP. The number of LLNP 
officers was 13 staffs of forest ecosystem controller and 
41 Rangers who control the national park area covering 
an area 217,991.18 ha (BBTNLL 2014). The wide 
management area would lead high enforcement cost and 
imperfect information, so that cause free riders (Rustagi 
et al. 2010).
  Customay institutions, in homogenous villages that 
had little migrant, had high-capacity to control access of 
forest use, but in heterogeneous village that had many 
migrants, customary institutions had the low control 
capacity of forest use. Customary rules, in villages that 
had many migrants, could not be able to regulate the use 
of forest resources. LKD only had high control capacity 
in the wilderness zone areas because they had high 
motivation to keep water sources and to avoid disaster, 
but in the rehabilitation zone area, LKD had the low 
control capacity and they could not impose sanctions for 
those who violate the rules of CCA because the land in 
rehabilitation zone areas had become a farm and de facto 
the land privately owned. Local communities preferred to 
manage continuously their farm in rehabilitation zone 
areas, even though their preference does not support by 
legal formal rules.
  FWP had high-capacity to maintain local community 
rights on forest resources in LLNP when Central 
Sulawesi Integrated Area Development Conservation 
Project (CSIADCP) was running and local government 
was still supporting funds, facilities and infrastructures. 
However, their capacity has been low since the project 
ended and they also did not anymore supported by the 
local government because of limited funding.
  Capacity of NGO that facilitate the process of 
formulating CCA, such as NGOs Jambata and Karsa, did 
not have high-capacity to maintain access of the local 
communities because their programs depend on donors . 
It was also revealed by Anshari (2006), NGOs as a 
facilitator in Danau Sentarum National Park had the low 
technical and financial capacity and their roles often 
inconsistent because they had to adjust the programs 
offered by a donor. 
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 Conclusion
 Institutional sustainability of community conservation 
agreement designed in LLNP as collaboration management 
has barriers  due to the structure of governance or the main 
policy of national park management at constitutional level do 
not support the local communities' rights at the collective-
choice level to regulate the internal use the CCA forest of 
resource in LLNP. Local decisions which have been arranged 
could not be implemented due to not in line with 
constitutional rules of national park management. 
Arrangement of institution and property rights should 
consider the capacity of stakeholders in implementing the 
rules of CCA.  Low capacity of local institutions in 
heterogeneous villages that have many migrants in 
controlling and regulating the forest use, especially in 
rehabilitation zone areas, has become a barrier for 
institutional sustainability of CCA. Therefore, enabling 
conditions for sustainability of CCA as collaboration of 
national park management are the change in rules at the 
constitutional level that accommodate sustainability of 
livelihoods of local communities, strengthening local 
institutions' capacity and ultimately integrating institution of 
CCA as part of LLNP management. 
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